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MAKING SENSE OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY:
WHY CALIFORNIA’S PROGRESSIVE GLOBAL WARMING
AND ANIMAL WELFARE LEGISLATION DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
Jeffrey M. Schmitt*
The dormant Commerce Clause’s extraterritoriality doctrine has long baffled
courts and legal scholars. Rather than attempt to make sense of the doctrine, most
scholars have instead argued that it should be abandoned as unnecessary and unwork-
able. Such scholarship, however, is of little use to the lower courts struggling with
extraterritoriality issues. The federal courts in California, for example, have recently
been forced to rule on challenges to California’s landmark carbon emissions and animal
welfare legislation. Plaintiffs in these cases argue that California is regulating extrater-
ritorially by telling ethanol producers and farmers in other states how to run their busi-
nesses. In these cases, the litigants and federal courts have struggled to formulate a
coherent account of the doctrine, thus throwing California’s progressive legislation into
doubt.
This Article proposes a new test based on existing lower court precedent to clarify
the extraterritoriality doctrine. Under this proposal, a state’s regulation of in-state con-
duct would violate the extraterritoriality principle only when it: (1) inescapably has the
practical effect of regulating conduct beyond the state’s borders; and (2) such regulated
extraterritorial conduct lacks a corresponding in-state interest. Not only is this test sup-
ported by existing precedent, but it would also best serve the policy justification for the
extraterritoriality doctrine by properly allocating state power in our federal system.
Applying this proposed test to California’s legislation would provide a clear and coher-
ent way to uphold California’s attempt to reduce the carbon emissions caused by
Californians and to eliminate California’s role in cruelty to farm animals.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the dormant Commerce Clause’s extraterritoriality doctrine, a state
law cannot have the “practical effect” of regulating conduct that “takes place
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wholly outside of the State’s borders.”1 This doctrine is intuitively appealing, as
one state should not be able to legislate for the rest of the country. And yet,
because of the interconnected nature of the modern economy, most state regula-
tions have some extraterritorial effects.2 Without clear guidance from the Su-
preme Court, the lower courts have struggled to find a principled way to limit
the doctrine, resulting in confusing and seemingly inconsistent decisions.3
Legal scholars have done little to help clarify the situation. Rather than
attempting to make sense of the current doctrine, most scholars have instead
focused their energy on arguing that extraterritorialty should not be a constitu-
tional limit on state power.4 These proposals, however, are of little use to the
courts and litigants currently struggling with extraterritoriality issues. Like it or
1 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982); see also, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Brown-Forman
Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582–83 (1986).
2 Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468,
1521 (2007).
3 See, e.g., Eric M. Berman, P.C. v. City of New York, 895 F. Supp. 2d 453, 478 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“Ultimately, as the Supreme Court has acknowledged, there is no sharply drawn line separating
laws which impermissibly regulate extraterritorial commerce from those which do not.”); Mark D.
Rosen, State Extraterritorial Powers Reconsidered, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1154 (2010)
(“[C]onstitutional doctrine to this day does not clearly tell us to what extent states may regulate
people and things outside their borders.”); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State
Power: Reflections on the Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NO-
TRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1112 (2009) (asserting that “the current doctrine lacks coherence, clear
boundaries, and ease of application”); Daniel Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Con-
stitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 899 (2008) (asserting that “the ban on extraterritoriality is logi-
cally incoherent”); Michael J. Ruttinger, Is There a Dormant Extraterritoriality Principle?
Commerce Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws, 106 MICH. L. REV. 545, 559 (2007) (asserting
that “courts struggle to apply the principle consistently, much less to define the scope of conduct
it applies to”); Peter C. Felmly, Beyond the Reach of the States: The Dormant Commerce Clause,
Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 492
(2003) (“Essentially, the lower federal courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court, have
utilized the extraterritoriality principle without comprehending exactly what the principle is and
without any clear understanding of how to define it.”). In a foundational article on extraterritorial-
ity, Donald H. Regan summarizes the doctrine as follows: “For the most part, states may not
legislate extraterritorially, whatever exactly that means.” Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I)
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extra-
territorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1896 (1987).
4 Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan O. Sykes, for example, “submit that the appropriate statement of the
extraterritoriality concern is that states may not impose burdens on out-of-state actors that out-
weigh the in-state benefits.” Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 804 (2001); see also Farber, supra note 3, at 899 (advocat- R
ing use of a balancing test). Moreover, Mark D. Rosen contends extraterritoriality should only be
a concern with protectionist state laws. See Mark D. Rosen, Extraterritoriality and Political Het-
erogeneity in American Federalism, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 855, 922 (2002). In a concurring opinion
in American Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 378 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring),
Judge Sutton argued that the doctrine should be completely abandoned because it “is a relic of the
old world with no useful role to play in the new.” See also Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth
Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J.
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127, 129 (2014) (arguing that the extraterritoriality doctrine should be
abandoned or significantly limited in most circumstances); Sam Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innova-
tion: A Next Generation Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 381, 421–23 (2013)
(same); Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal
Post-Mortem, 73 LA. L. REV. 979, 992–95 (2013) (arguing that lower courts have narrowly inter-
preted the Court’s extraterritoriality precedent, “significantly” limiting its continued vitality);
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not, the extraterritoriality principle is firmly embedded in the Supreme Court’s
precedent. Although academics are free to say that binding precedent should be
ignored, lower courts are not. Using California’s progressive carbon emissions
and animal welfare legislation as examples, this Article contributes to the litera-
ture on extraterritoriality by highlighting the doctrinal confusion and proposing
a coherent way to define the prohibition on extraterritorial legislation based on
existing precedent.
In its global warming legislation, California regulates in-state ethanol sales
based on the manner in which the ethanol was produced and distributed in other
states.5 Out-of-state producers have challenged this law, claiming that Califor-
nia’s legislation has the practical effect of regulating extraterritorially.6 Califor-
nia’s more recent animal welfare legislation, which prohibits the sale of eggs
produced by chickens kept in tiny “battery cages,” raises analogous extraterri-
toriality issues by essentially requiring out-of-state farmers to comply with Cal-
ifornia law.7 Although a sharply divided U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has upheld California’s global warming legislation,8 the courts have yet
to rule on the state’s animal welfare legislation. Because the courts have yet to
reach a consensus on the proper approach to extraterritoriality, the constitution-
ality of this law remains in doubt.
This Article proposes a new doctrinal test that has the potential to provide
clarity and consistency to the courts’ extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Under this
proposal, which is derived from existing precedent, a state regulation of in-state
conduct violates the extraterritoriality principle only when the regulation: (1)
lacks a corresponding in-state interest; and (2) inescapably has the practical
effect of regulating conduct beyond the state’s borders. A court applying this
test to California’s progressive legislation would likely find that both statutes
are constitutional. Although California’s legislation regulates the out-of-state
production of ethanol and eggs bound for the California market, California ar-
guably has a corresponding interest in the production of such goods. This is
because, regardless of where the goods are produced, California arguably has
an interest in making sure that its citizens do not participate in animal cruelty or
unnecessarily add to global warming. And, although out-of-state egg and etha-
nol producers may choose to change their operations with respect to products
sold in other states—transactions in which California has no interest—nothing
in California’s laws requires them to do so, meaning that such effects are not
“inescapable.” If accepted, this Article’s doctrinal proposal would both serve
basic principles of federalism and allow states to enact meaningful economic
regulation in our interconnected national economy. The proposed test would
serve the basic purpose of the doctrine by preventing one state from regulating
the rest of the country. Under this Article’s proposal, a state generally could not
Florey, supra note 3, at 1090 (“The extraterritoriality prohibition . . . is so sweeping that most R
commentators have assumed that these cases cannot mean what they appear to say.”).
5 See infra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. R
6 See infra note 100 and accompanying text. R
7 See infra notes 146–48 and accompanying text. R
8 See infra text accompanying notes 114–15. R
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use in-state sales as a hook to regulate the same company’s unrelated out-of-
state sales. Moreover, because it would only prohibit extraterritorial effects in
which the regulating state has no interest, the doctrine would preserve room for
states to pass legislation to address local problems.
The plaintiffs challenging California’s legislation, however, argue that a
state should not be able to regulate products based on the manner in which they
were produced in other states.9 Under this competing test, which this author
shall call the “manner of production test,” California’s legislation is unconstitu-
tional because, although the regulated eggs and ethanol are identical once they
cross California’s borders, they are treated differently based on how they were
produced in other states. According to the plaintiffs, the manner of production
test best serves federalism by preserving the sovereignty of other states to regu-
late their own production processes.10
California’s legislation, however, illustrates why this Article’s doctrinal
proposal better serves underlying federalism values. In its legislation, Califor-
nia has exercised its sovereignty, or political power, to regulate the sale of
goods within its borders for the benefit of its residents. Specifically, California
is limiting its citizens’ contributions to global warming and protecting its citi-
zens from the moral harm of purchasing the products of animal cruelty. Moreo-
ver, despite arguments to the contrary,11 these laws in no way undermine the
sovereign power of other states. California’s legislation simply does not, indeed
cannot, interfere with another state’s power to enact or enforce its own legisla-
tion on these subjects.
California’s regulations instead conflict with another fundamental princi-
ple of “our federalism”—the principle that the states are equal units of the
federal system.12 When California discourages the sale of fuel or eggs only
because California disapproves of the production methods used in other states,
it does not give equal respect to those other states’ laws. Rather than take politi-
cal power from, say, Missouri, California has instead labeled Missouri law as
cruel, inhumane, or otherwise unfit for Californians. While this Article’s propo-
sal would preserve California’s sovereignty, the manner of production test
therefore would instead sacrifice state sovereignty to ensure that California is
treating the law of other states equally.
The constitutionality of California’s statutes therefore turns on a conflict
between two principles of federalism: state sovereignty and the equality of state
law. Once these values are put into focus, the proper outcome becomes clear.
While state sovereignty is a bedrock principle of constitutional law, the goal of
giving equal respect to the laws of the several states has traditionally been seen
as aspirational rather than legally enforceable.13 A deep analysis of the theoreti-
9 See infra text accompanying note 110. R
10 See infra notes 198–201 and accompanying text. R
11 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Rocky Mountain Farmers
Union Appellees, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos.
12-15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL 3594433 [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors].
12 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013).
13 See infra notes 198–201, 203–19 and accompanying text. R
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cal underpinnings of the extraterritorially doctrine thus supports this Article’s
doctrinal proposal, which gives states wide latitude to exercise their sovereign
power to regulate in-state conduct. California should be permitted to use its
sovereign power to prevent its citizens from contributing to global warming
and participating in animal cruelty, even if doing so shows a lack of respect for
the equality of the laws of other states.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides an outline of the extra-
territoriality doctrine and proposes a doctrinal synthesis of existing precedent.
Part II uses California’s global warming and animal rights legislation as exam-
ples to illustrate the need for doctrinal clarity and the policy issues at stake.
Finally, Part III analyzes the constitutional values at stake and argues that state
sovereignty supports this Article’s doctrinal proposal and upholding California’s
legislation.
I. MAKING SENSE OF THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY DOCTRINE
Although the Commerce Clause of the Constitution does not expressly
limit state power, the Supreme Court has long held that it does so by implica-
tion.14 According to the Court, “the ‘negative’ or ‘dormant’ aspect of the Com-
merce Clause prohibits States from ‘advanc[ing] their own commercial
interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out
of the state.’” 15 The doctrine is designed to “create an area of trade free from
interference by the States,”16 and therefore “avoid the tendencies toward eco-
nomic Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later
among the States under the Articles of Confederation.”17 At its core, the dor-
mant Commerce Clause is based on the assumption that “the peoples of the
several states must sink or swim together.”18
Ordinarily, to determine if a state law violates the dormant Commerce
Clause, a court must decide whether the law discriminates against out-of-state
commerce.19 Discriminatory laws are presumptively unconstitutional and can
be upheld only if “justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protection-
ism.”20 Nondiscriminatory laws are unconstitutional if the “burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”21
14 See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens ex rel. Soc’y for Relief of Distressed Pilots, 53 U.S. 299,
318–19 (1852).
15 Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992)
(alteration in original) (quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949)).
16 Bos. Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977) (quoting Freeman v. Hewit,
329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946)).
17 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325–26 (1979).
18 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
19 United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 338
(2007).
20 Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at 359.
21 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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Regardless of whether the law discriminates against out-of-state com-
merce, the dormant Commerce Clause also contains a blanket prohibition on all
extraterritorial state legislation. Under this rule, a state cannot regulate conduct
that “takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders,” even if the state has an
interest in doing so.22 In other words, a state may not “project its legislation
into [other States],”23 or “‘directly’ attempt to assert extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion over persons or property.”24 Michigan, for example, cannot tell an out-of-
state seller how to label products sold in Indiana.25
The Supreme Court, however, has never clearly explained how the dor-
mant Commerce Clause’s ban on extraterritorial legislation applies when a state
directly regulates only in-state conduct, but such regulation has out-of-state ef-
fects. For example, what if, instead of directly regulating sales in Indiana,
Michigan prohibited an out-of-state company from selling products in Michi-
gan unless it changed its labeling practices in Indiana? Because most state laws
have some effects beyond their borders, the extraterritoriality doctrine does not
bar all regulations of in-state conduct that have extraterritorial effects. Al-
though the Supreme Court has held that a state can violate the extraterritoriality
principle through the regulation of in-state conduct, it has provided no clear
limiting principle to determine when the extraterritoriality doctrine is
implicated.
The Supreme Court gave its broadest formulation of the extraterritoriality
doctrine in Healy v. Beer Institute.26 In Healy, a Connecticut law required any
out-of-state company that sold beer to Connecticut wholesalers to affirm to the
state that it was not offering lower prices in any neighboring state for the next
month.27 The Court held that the Connecticut price affirmation law was uncon-
stitutional because it had “the undeniable effect of controlling commercial ac-
tivity occurring wholly outside the boundary of the State.”28 The Court
explained that “[t]he critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regu-
lation is to control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”29
Focusing on the Court’s “practical effect” language, Healy appears to an-
nounce a robust extraterritoriality principle. In fact, litigants in other cases have
challenged a range of state laws by arguing that a state’s legislation cannot have
22 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982); see also, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 572–73 (1996); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); CTS Corp. v. Dy-
namics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 582–83 (1986). Although the extraterritoriality doctrine originally arose in the con-
text of the Due Process Clause, see Denning, supra note 4, at 981, it is now firmly rooted in the R
dormant Commerce Clause.
23 Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 583 (alteration in original) (quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521).
24 Edgar, 457 U.S. at 624 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197 (1977)).
25 See Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 700 F.3d 796, 810 (6th Cir. 2012).
26 491 U.S. at 324; see Denning, supra note 4, at 988. R
27 Healy, 491 U.S. at 326–27.
28 Id. at 337 (emphasis added).
29 Id. at 336.
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any practical effects beyond its borders.30 Although the lower courts have con-
sistently rejected such an expansive interpretation of extraterritoriality,31 they
have not agreed on any uniform principles to limit extraterritoriality’s reach.32
This Article proposes two new limitations on the extraterritoriality doc-
trine that could help bring clarity and uniformity to this confusing area of law.
By synthesizing the common reasoning and holdings of various cases, this Arti-
cle proposes the following doctrine: A state regulation may have the practical
effect of regulating out-of-state conduct only if: (1) the state has a correspond-
ing interest in the out-of-state conduct that is being regulated; and (2) the regu-
lation is not inescapable.33 Although no court has ever explicitly endorsed this
doctrinal proposal, it is arguably consistent with federal precedent.
The first proposed principle, which this author shall call the “correspond-
ing interest principle,” is derived from the Supreme Court’s decision in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp.,34 an opinion that pre-dated Healy and did not even
mention the term “extraterritoriality.” The Court in CTS upheld an Indiana stat-
ute that required approval from a majority of the preexisting shareholders
before a change in control of certain Indiana corporations.35 The law applied
only to corporations chartered in Indiana that had specified levels of shares or
shareholders within the state and that opted into the statute’s protection.36
The plaintiffs argued that the law was unconstitutional because it would
require state approval even when both the entity acquiring the company and the
preexisting shareholders were residents of another state.37 The Court, however,
upheld the law, reasoning that it did not discriminate against out-of-state enti-
ties38 and posed no risk of inconsistent regulations since it governed only Indi-
ana corporations.39
Although the Court in CTS did not explicitly invoke the extraterritoriality
doctrine, it upheld a state law that had practical effects beyond its borders. In a
decision discussing CTS’s relationship to the extraterritoriality doctrine, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that the Supreme Court
upheld the Indiana statute because any burden it placed on extraterritorial con-
duct was accompanied by a “corresponding and significant protection for a
legitimate interest of local residents.”40 Under this reasoning, the Indiana stat-
30 See, e.g., Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 336 F.3d 545, 546 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Appellants claim that
such precedent mandates the per se invalidation of every state regulation that has any extraterrito-
rial effect whatsoever.” (emphasis in original)).
31 See, e.g., id. (“This principle is not established by the cases they cite and is contradicted by
other authority.”).
32 See supra note 3. R
33 Of course, a state also may not directly regulate wholly extraterritorial conduct. See supra notes
22–25 and accompanying text. R
34 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
35 Id. at 69.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 88, 93.
38 Id. at 70.
39 Id. at 71.
40 Alliant Energy Corp. v. Bie, 336 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2003).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\39-2\HLE204.txt unknown Seq: 8 24-JUN-15 8:29
430 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 39
ute was valid because it applied only to Indiana corporations, and the State had
a legitimate interest in regulating its own corporations. In other words, the ex-
traterritorial conduct being regulated—the acquisition of the Indiana corpora-
tion—itself had a sufficient relationship to the regulating state.
The corresponding interest principle can be used to distinguish CTS from
Edgar v. MITE Corp.,41 another Supreme Court case from the 1980s regarding
corporate governance. Edgar struck down an Illinois law that essentially re-
quired state approval before a takeover of any corporation in which at least ten
percent of the outstanding shares were owned by Illinois residents.42 Unlike
CTS, the Illinois law in Edgar therefore applied to a tender offer for an out-of-
state corporation, even when the offer occurred through the use of interstate
commerce and the corporation was majority owned by out-of-state entities.43
The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it had “a sweeping
extraterritorial effect.”44 As the Seventh Circuit explained when distinguishing
CTS from Edgar, the Illinois law at issue in Edgar ran afoul of the extraterrito-
riality doctrine because Illinois had no interest that corresponded to the extra-
territorial conduct being regulated (the wholly out-of-state takeover of an out-
of-state corporation).45
While the corresponding interest principle helps to make sense of the Su-
preme Court’s precedent, the second proposed principle, which this author shall
call the “inescapable practical effects principle,” helps to explain how the
lower courts have upheld a number of regulations that have practical effects
beyond their borders, including state labeling laws.46 In National Electric Man-
ufacturers Ass’n v. Sorrell,47 for example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit upheld a Vermont law requiring that some products sold in Ver-
mont, including fluorescent light bulbs, be labeled as containing mercury.48 Cit-
ing Healy, the plaintiff light bulb manufacturers argued that the law would have
the “practical effect” of forcing them to attach the Vermont label to light bulbs
sold throughout the country due to their national distribution process.49 The
Second Circuit, however, held that the plaintiff’s “extraterritoriality contention
fails because the statute does not inescapably require manufacturers to label all
lamps wherever distributed.”50 The court explained: “To avoid the statute’s al-
leged impact on other states, lamp manufacturers could arrange their produc-
tion and distribution processes to produce labeled lamps solely for the Vermont
41 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
42 Id. at 646. The Illinois law had other possible triggering events as well. See id. at 624.
43 Id. at 642.
44 Id.
45 See Alliant Energy, 336 F.3d at 549.
46 See, e.g., Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647–48 (6th Cir. 2010); Nat’l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111–12 (2d Cir. 2001); Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d
790, 794 (8th Cir. 1995).
47 272 F.3d 104.
48 Id. at 107. The Vermont law further required the products to be recycled or disposed of as
hazardous waste. Id.
49 Id. at 110.
50 Id. (emphasis added).
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market and then pass much of the increased costs along to Vermont consumers
in the form of higher prices.”51
The Second Circuit’s decision in Sorrell can be explained in terms of this
Article’s two proposed principles. Although the Vermont law may have had
practical effects on light bulbs bound for out-of-state markets, such effects were
not inescapable because the law did not require the plaintiffs to change their
labeling practices with respect to sales in other states. The only extraterritorial
conduct that was inescapably regulated by Vermont, therefore, was the produc-
tion of light bulbs bound for the Vermont market. And Vermont had a corre-
sponding interest in regulating the production of products bound for Vermont.
By contrast, the price affirmation law at issue in Healy had the inescapable
effect of regulating out-of-state conduct in which Connecticut had no interest—
a sale from an out-of-state beer supplier to an out-of-state buyer.52 Unlike the
Connecticut law in Healy, the Vermont law did not inescapably regulate the
out-of-state production of light bulbs bound for an out-of-state market.
This Article’s doctrinal proposal similarly helps to explain other lower
court decisions. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Interna-
tional Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs,53 upheld an Ohio law prohibiting dairy
processors from making certain claims and requiring them to include disclaim-
ers on milk labels. The court explained that “the Ohio Rule’s labeling require-
ments have no direct effect on the Processors’ out-of-state labeling conduct.
That is to say, how the Processors label their products in Ohio has no bearing
on how they are required to label their products in other states (or vice
versa).”54 In other words, the Ohio law inescapably regulated only the labeling
of milk bound for Ohio, and Ohio had a corresponding interest in the labelling
of such milk.
Moreover, in Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams,55 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit upheld a Minnesota law that banned the in-state sale of pe-
troleum-sweeping compounds against a challenge that it had the effect of regu-
lating wholly out-of-state sales between the manufacturer and the distributor of
the compound.56 In a statement that captures the inescapable effects rule, the
court stated that “a statute has extraterritorial reach when it necessarily requires
out-of-state commerce to be conducted according to in-state terms.”57 The court
continued: “Clearly, the Act has affected Cotto Waxo’s participation in inter-
51 Id.
52 The only way for the supplier in Healy to escape the extraterritorial reach of the Connecticut
law was to stop selling in Connecticut, and the court in Healy held that a state may not force a
party to alter its wholly out-of-state conduct as a condition on its in-state sales. Healy v. Beer Inst.,
491 U.S. 324, 337 (1989) (“[T]he Commerce Clause dictates that no State may force an out-of-
state merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before undertaking a transaction in
another.”).
53 622 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2010).
54 Id. at 647.
55 46 F.3d 790 (8th Cir. 1995).
56 Id. at 793, 794–95.
57 Id. at 794.
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state commerce.”58 The court nevertheless upheld the statute, likely because
Minnesota had a corresponding interest in the plaintiff’s sales of items bound
for Minnesota.59
The Supreme Court’s most recent extraterritoriality case, Pharmaceutical
Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh,60 can also be explained in
terms of this Article’s proposed doctrinal test. In Walsh, Maine required drug
companies to enter into rebate agreements with the state for drugs sold to
Maine Medicaid patients. Under these rebate agreements, the drug companies
paid a percentage of the revenue generated from sales in Maine to the state.61
This money was in turn given to pharmacies that agreed to sell the drugs at a
discount to Maine residents.62 If a drug company did not agree to give the re-
bates, Maine subjected its drugs to a time-consuming and costly pre-approval
process before its drugs could be prescribed to Maine Medicaid patients.63 Be-
cause the out-of-state drug company plaintiffs in Walsh did not sell their prod-
ucts directly into Maine, but instead sold only to out-of-state wholesalers, they
argued that the Maine plan had the practical effect of regulating extraterritorial
conduct, i.e., the wholly out-of-state transaction between the drug company and
the wholesaler.64
The Court in Walsh rejected the plaintiff’s argument with the following
language, which was taken from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit’s opinion below:
[T]he Maine Act does not regulate the price of any out-of-state trans-
action, either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect. Maine
does not insist that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for
a certain price. Similarly, Maine is not tying the price of its in-state
products to out-of-state prices.65
Although the Court’s discussion was brief, the First Circuit’s decision in
Walsh, which the Supreme Court relied upon heavily in its decision, provides
further insight. Below in Walsh, the First Circuit explained that the Maine law
does not directly regulate extraterritorially because the “regulation only applies
to in-state activities,” i.e., the purchase of drugs in Maine, the negotiation of
58 Id.
59 Id.; see also, e.g., SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 192–95 (2d Cir. 2007) (rejecting
the argument that a state regulation of prepaid gift cards regulated extraterritorially because the
law did not “by its terms or its effects, directly regulate sales of gift cards in other states”);
Freedom Holdings Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (“While the out-of-state
wholesale prices of cigarettes may be affected by the Contraband Statutes, therefore, out-of-state
actors such as appellants remain free to conduct commerce on their own terms, without either
scrutiny or control by New York State.”).
60 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003).
61 Id.; see also Brandon P. Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[age], 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 9 (2003).
62 Id. at 10.
63 Id.
64 Walsh, 538 U.S. at 669–70.
65 Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66,
81–82 (1st Cir. 2001)).
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the rebate between Maine and the drug company, and the possible preauthoriza-
tion required if the drug company did not agree to a rebate.66 Although the First
Circuit conceded that the regulation could have a practical effect on the profit-
ability of the drug companies’ out-of-state transactions with wholesalers, the
court found any such out-of-state effects were distinguishable from those at
issue in Healy.67 In Healy, the First Circuit explained, the Connecticut statute
had the effect of regulating the price of beer sold by out-of-state companies to
out-of-state consumers.68 By contrast, the First Circuit explained, although the
Maine law at issue in Walsh influences out-of-state transactions between a
manufacturer and a wholesaler, those out-of-state transactions only concern
products bound for the Maine market.69
The reasoning used by the Supreme Court and First Circuit is fully consis-
tent with this Article’s proposed doctrine.70 Maine did not condition in-state
sales on the companies changing their out-of-state practices with respect to
goods bound for out-of-state markets. Maine’s legislation therefore had the in-
escapable effect of regulating only the sale of drugs bound for the Maine mar-
ket. Moreover, Maine had a corresponding and significant interest in these
transactions. In fact, the corresponding interest and inescapable effect princi-
ples make Walsh an easy case.
This Article’s proposed doctrine not only provides a way to understand
why courts have upheld state legislation that has significant extraterritorial ef-
fects, but it could also help to explain why the lower courts have struck down a
number of statutes on extraterritoriality grounds in recent years. In American
Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder,71 for example, the Sixth Circuit struck down a Michi-
gan law that required the sellers of beverage containers to place a certain mark
on all containers sold in Michigan and prohibited containers containing such
markings from being sold in other states.72 The court held that the Michigan
statute had an impermissible extraterritorial effect because it both dictated what
the container manufacturers could sell in other states and essentially forced
other states to comply with its regulations.
Although not discussed by the Sixth Circuit, the Michigan law violated the
doctrinal proposal discussed above. Unlike the labelling law in Sorrell, which
did not dictate how light bulbs must be labeled in other states, the Michigan
law had the inescapable effect of prohibiting out-of-state companies from sell-
ing containers with the Michigan mark to out-of-state consumers. Moreover,
just as Connecticut had no interest in regulating wholly out-of-state beer sales
in Healy, Michigan arguably had no corresponding interest in regulating out-of-
66 Concannon, 249 F.3d at 82.
67 Id. at 82–83.
68 Id. at 81–82. The First Circuit made similar arguments with respect to Brown-Forman and See-
lig. See id.
69 Id.
70 Of course, neither court explicitly endorsed the doctrinal test advanced here.
71 700 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2012).
72 Id. at 801–02. The mark could be used in “other states that have laws substantially similar” to
Michigan’s. Id. at 801.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\39-2\HLE204.txt unknown Seq: 12 24-JUN-15 8:29
434 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 39
state container sales to out-of-state consumers. The Michigan law therefore vio-
lated the extraterritoriality doctrine.
This Article’s proposed doctrine also explains why the Seventh Circuit
struck down a Wisconsin waste disposal law on extraterritoriality grounds in
National Solid Wastes Management Ass’n v. Meyer.73 The court explained that
“Wisconsin’s solid waste legislation condition[ed] the use of Wisconsin land-
fills by non-Wisconsin waste generators on their home communities’ adoption
and enforcement of Wisconsin recycling standards.”74 Again, this legislation
inescapably regulated conduct in other states because out-of-state communities
were forced to choose between either following the Wisconsin law or being
banned from the Wisconsin market. Moreover, Wisconsin had no correspond-
ing interest in the regulated conduct because “all persons in that non-Wisconsin
community must adhere to the Wisconsin standards whether or not they dump
their waste in Wisconsin.”75
Most recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota struck
down Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act in North Dakota v. Heyd-
inger.76 This statute established standards regarding the use and generation of
energy with the goal of reducing carbon emissions.77 The court held that the
statute was unconstitutional because it had the practical effect of “requir[ing]
out-of-state entities to seek regulatory approval in Minnesota before undertak-
ing transactions in other states.”78 The court explained that:
[T]he transmission of electricity . . . does not recognize state bound-
aries. Therefore, when a non-Minnesota entity injects electricity into
the grid to satisfy its obligations to a non-Minnesota member, it can-
not ensure that the electricity will not travel to and be removed in—in
other words, be imported to and contribute to statewide power sector
carbon dioxide emissions in—Minnesota.79
As a result, out-of-state entities were inescapably forced to comply with Minne-
sota law before generating and transmitting power to other states. Moreover,
although the court did not address the corresponding interest limitation, Minne-
sota had no interest in these transactions between out-of-state energy compa-
nies and consumers in other states.
To summarize, the extraterritoriality doctrine prohibits states from directly
regulating extraterritorially and from regulating in-state conduct in a way that
has the practical effect of regulating conduct that occurs wholly outside of its
borders. A broad interpretation of this doctrine, however, would open most
state economic legislation to constitutional attack. The lower courts have there-
73 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit struck down a
portion of a similar law in Hardage v. Atkins, 619 F.2d 871, 873–74 (10th Cir. 1980).
74 Meyer, 63 F.3d at 658.
75 Id.
76 15 F. Supp. 3d 891, 919 (D. Minn. 2014).
77 Id. at 897–98.
78 Id. at 916.
79 Id. at 917.
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fore consistently applied the doctrine only when the regulation of in-state con-
duct has the inescapable practical effect of regulating extraterritorial conduct in
which the state has no corresponding interest.80
Although this interpretation, if accepted by the courts, would bring much-
needed clarity to the extraterritoriality doctrine, it admittedly would not provide
a clear answer in every case. Determining whether a state has a “corresponding
interest” in the extraterritorial conduct being regulated could be especially dif-
ficult. The key, however, is to ask whether the state has an interest in the out-
of-state conduct that is being regulated rather than simply asking whether the
state has a sufficient interest in applying its regulatory scheme.81 Courts have
found, for example, that a state has a sufficient interest to regulate the out-of-
state labelling of goods bound for in-state consumers.82 This is because a state
has an obvious interest in making sure that its citizens are aware of the dangers
of the products they purchase in-state. Other situations, however, are less clear.
For example, does a state have a sufficient interest to regulate the in-state sale
of goods produced by out-of-state companies that fail to pay a living wage?
Here, the state’s interest—preventing its citizens from participating in the ex-
ploitation of out-of-state workers—may be too attenuated.83 Even if this Arti-
cle’s doctrinal proposal would not provide a clear answer in such cases,
however, its acceptance would be a marked improvement over the current situ-
ation, in which courts and litigants continue to struggle over how to limit
Healy’s broad practical effects language.
80 As discussed infra Part II, however, litigants commonly argue for a more expansive interpreta-
tion of the extraterritoriality doctrine, and the federal courts have occasionally been receptive to
such arguments. See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. R
81 This, among other things, distinguishes the extraterritoriality inquiry from the standard dormant
Commerce Clause test, which compares the state’s interest in the regulation to the burden on
interstate commerce. See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text. R
82 See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2014); Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n
v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 648 (6th Cir. 2013). The corresponding interest rule could be seen as
similar to the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction. Just as a defendant has minimum
contacts when it “purposely avails” itself of the forum by, among other things, targeting its con-
duct at the forum, a state has a sufficient interest to regulate conduct that is being directed at the
state. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 781 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S.
783, 789–90 (1984) (describing the minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction). It is safe to
say, however, that the corresponding interest rule bears little resemblance to the dormant Com-
merce Clause’s “nexus” requirement for state taxes. In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430
U.S. 274, 279 (1977), the Court held that a state tax violates the dormant Commerce Clause if it is
applied to an activity that lacks a “substantial nexus” to the taxing state. The Court later explained
in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992), that, for a company to have a substan-
tial nexus to a state, and thus be subject to its use taxes, the company must have a physical
presence within the state. Cases decided under the extraterritoriality doctrine, however, have
found a sufficient interest even when the regulated entity did not have a physical presence within
the state. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 669 (2003).
83 See Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 524 (1935) (arguing that commerce would be
“burdened unduly” if a state were to “condition importation upon proof of a satisfactory wage
scale in factory or shop”).
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II. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND CALIFORNIA’S PROGRESSIVE GLOBAL
WARMING AND ANIMAL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
California’s recent legislation on carbon emissions and farm animal wel-
fare illustrates the need for doctrinal clarity and highlights the values at stake.
This Part provides a concrete factual setting for extraterritoriality by summariz-
ing the statutes, analyzing the litigation over their constitutionality, and apply-
ing this Article’s doctrinal proposal.
A. California’s Global Warming Solutions Act
Despite widespread agreement over the dire effects of global warming,
federal law has done little in recent years to curb carbon emissions or en-
courage renewable fuels.84 Moreover, because of crippling partisan gridlock
and widespread Republican opposition, Congress is unlikely to aggressively
respond to the threat of global warming any time soon.85 Any meaningful re-
form will likely therefore need to bypass Congress.86
California led the way in responding to climate change with its Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006, which requires California to reduce its green-
house gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.87 When signing California’s legis-
lation, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger declared: “California will not wait
for our federal government to take strong action on global warming.”88 Califor-
nia’s legislature similarly found that “[n]ational and international actions are
necessary to fully address the issue of global warming. However, action taken
by California to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases will have far-reaching
effects by encouraging other states, the federal government, and other countries
to act.”89 The legislature further explained that “[g]lobal warming poses a seri-
ous threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural resources, and the
environment of California. The potential adverse impacts of global warming
include the exacerbation of air quality problems, a reduction in . . . the Sierra
snowpack, [and] a rise in sea levels.”90
The California Global Warming Solutions Act delegated authority to the
California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) to create regulations to, among
84 Daniel K. Lee & Timothy P. Duane, Putting the Dormant Commerce Clause Back to Sleep:
Adapting the Doctrine to Support State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 43 ENVTL. L. 295, 297
(2013).
85 See, e.g., id.
86 In addition to state action, President Obama has recently announced sweeping action under the
authority of the Clean Air Act, which was passed in 1970. See Coral Davenport, Obama Builds
Environmental Legacy with 1970 Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), http://perma.cc/L59N-
EYWV. While this executive action is significant, it is inherently limited by the bounds of prior
legislation and could be reversed by the next President.
87 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013).
88 Erwin Chemerinsky et al., California, Climate Change, and the Constitution, 37 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,653, 10,654–55 (Sept. 2007) (quoting Governor Schwarzenegger).
89 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(d) (West 2015).
90 Id. § 38501(a).
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other things, reduce emissions associated with the transportation sector.91
CARB’s implementing regulations create a Low Carbon Fuel Standard
(“LCFS”), which assigns a carbon intensity to transportation fuel sold in the
state based on the emissions generated over the fuel’s lifecycle, including pro-
duction, distribution, and ultimate use.92 Using the LCFS, CARB mandates that
no entity selling transportation fuels in California can exceed a specified aver-
age annual carbon intensity rating.93 If any company is unable to meet the re-
quirement, it may purchase a credit from an entity that has an average carbon
intensity rating that is below the required average. California’s LCFS therefore
places economic incentives on companies that sell transportation fuels in Cali-
fornia to minimize carbon emissions during production and distribution, even
when such fuels are produced in other states.94
The LCFS analyzes the lifecycle of transportation fuels rather than exclu-
sively looking at emissions produced during consumption because doing so is
necessary to ensure that California reduces its carbon footprint.95 California im-
ports much of its energy, and thus if only in-state emissions are taken into
account, any improvements in California could be offset by increased pollution
in other states.96 Moreover, a focus only on emissions in California would ig-
nore the benefits of fuels such as ethanol, which reduce carbon during the pro-
duction process.97 The reduction of emissions caused by fuel consumption in
California therefore requires consideration of extraterritorial conduct.
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene,98 a group of companies
involved in the production and distribution of ethanol filed suit in federal court
against California’s LCFS, arguing that it violated the dormant Commerce
Clause’s extraterritoriality doctrine.99 Relying on an expansive interpretation of
Healy, the plaintiffs argued that the California law “controls conduct that oc-
curs wholly outside of California” because it has the practical effect of regulat-
ing, “among other things, deforestation in South America, how Midwest
farmers use their land, and how ethanol plants in the Midwest produce animal
nutrients.”100 Rather than attempt to refute the argument that the law would
have practical effects on out-of-state conduct, California argued such effects
91 See id. § 38562(a); see also Rocky Mountain v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079.
92 Rocky Mountain v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081.
93 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480.1(a), 95482(b) (2015); see Rocky Mountain v. Corey, 730
F.3d at 1080.
94 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–90 (2015).
95 Rocky Mountain v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081.
96 See Chemerinsky et al., supra note 88, at 10,655. R
97 Rocky Mountain v. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081. Although the use of ethanol pollutes at rates
similar to fossil fuels, overall emissions are much lower because ethanol production requires the
growth of crops such as corn that take carbon from the atmosphere.
98 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (E.D. Cal. 2011).
99 Id. at 1078. Plaintiffs challenged the law on other grounds as well. They argued that it was
preempted by the Clean Air Act and violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating
against interstate commerce and by failing the balancing test articulated in Pike. Id.
100 Id. at 1090–91; see also Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
at 11, Rocky Mountain v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (No. 09-CV-02234), 2010 WL
5882459, at *11.
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were not constitutionally significant because they were at most “indirect.”101
The State essentially argued that, because it directly regulated ethanol sales
only in California, it could not violate the extraterritoriality doctrine.102 The
State, however, did not provide the court with a clear explanation as to how its
argument was consistent with the broad language found in Healy, a case that
had also involved a statute which technically applied only to in-state sales.
The district court held that California’s LCFS violated the extraterritorial-
ity doctrine.103 The court correctly noted that the State’s “arguments improperly
focus[ed] on whether or not the LCFS directly regulates the out-of-state enti-
ties.”104 The court then quoted Healy’s broad formulation of the practical effects
test and found that “the ‘practical effect’ of the regulation would be to control”
the plaintiffs’ out-of-state conduct.105 Continuing to quote Healy, the court fur-
ther explained that, “in penalizing these practices to ‘incentiv[ize] regulated
parties to change’ their conduct (including conduct occurring wholly outside of
the state), [California] impermissibly attempt[ed] to ‘control conduct beyond
the boundary of the state.’” 106 According to the court, California had extended
its “police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds.”107 The district court, how-
ever, provided no suggestion of how to limit the reach of Healy’s practical
effects test. If taken literally, the court’s reasoning would therefore appear to
justify striking down any statute that influenced conduct beyond its borders, a
result that cannot possibly square with existing practices and precedent.
In their briefing before the Ninth Circuit, the parties did little to clear up
the doctrinal confusion surrounding extraterritoriality. Instead, plaintiffs again
primarily relied on a broad interpretation of Healy’s practical effects test.108 In
the alternative, plaintiffs advanced a new approach to extraterritoriality, which
this author shall call the “manner of production test.” Under this test, while a
state regulation may incidentally have some effects beyond its borders, “where
goods in interstate commerce are identical, and will have exactly the same im-
pacts within the state, a state may not penalize or ban their sale because of how
101 Rocky Mountain v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d at 1091; see also Defendant’s Memorandum of
Points & Authorities in Opposition to RMFU’S Motion for Summary Judgment at 14, Rocky
Mountain v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (No. 09-CV-02234), 2010 WL 5882464, at *14
[hereinafter Defendant’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities] (emphasis added) (asserting that
plaintiffs’ extraterritoriality argument “boils down to essentially one question: does the LCFS
directly regulate commerce wholly outside of California by including lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions in its calculation of CI values?”).
102 The State explained that entities with high carbon intensities were not required to change their
out-of-state practices; instead, they could simply pay for carbon credits on the state’s exchange.
See Defendant’s Memorandum of Points & Authorities, supra note 101, at 14–17. R
103 Rocky Mountain v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d. at 1091.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
107 Id. at 1092 (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkesville, 511 U.S. 383, 393 (1994)).
108 Brief of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union Appellees at 54, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v.
Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135), 2012 WL 3342559, at *54
(“Plaintiffs thus need show no more than that the practical effect of the LCFS is to control out-of-
state activity.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\39-2\HLE204.txt unknown Seq: 17 24-JUN-15 8:29
2015] Making Sense of Extraterritoriality 439
they were made elsewhere.”109 In other words, plaintiffs argued that, because
all ethanol is the same once it reaches California, the State should not be able to
treat it differently based on the manner in which it was produced out-of-state.110
For the first time on appeal, plaintiffs thus finally proposed a principle to limit
Healy’s practical effects test.
In its brief before the Ninth Circuit, however, California convincingly ar-
gued that plaintiffs’ expansive interpretation of Healy was unworkable and that
the manner of production test was invented from whole cloth.111 The State then
cited a number of circuit court cases to show that a state law is not invalid
simply because it creates economic incentives for out-of-state actors to change
their conduct.112 Relying on Walsh, California essentially argued that the “prac-
tical effects” language from Healy was no longer good law.113
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey,114 the Ninth Circuit reversed
the district court and held that California’s LCFS did not violate the extraterri-
toriality doctrine. Citing Walsh, the court held: “States may not mandate com-
pliance with their preferred policies in wholly out-of-state transactions, but they
are free to regulate commerce and contracts within their boundaries with the
goal of influencing the out-of-state choices of market participants.”115 The court
found that, because “[t]he Fuel Standard regulates only the California mar-
ket,”116 it could not violate the extraterritoriality doctrine. Moreover, the court
rejected the manner of production test by stating: “Plaintiffs point to no extra-
territoriality cases where differences in the physical structure of a product was a
prerequisite to regulation.”117
From a policy standpoint, the Ninth Circuit explained that the LCFS
should be upheld because the legislature determined that a regulation that influ-
ences out-of-state conduct was necessary for California to decrease its contribu-
tion to global warming.118 The court explained that, while California “cannot
peacefully impose its own regulatory standards on another jurisdiction,” the
State “may regulate with reference to local harms, structuring its internal mar-
kets to set incentives for firms to produce less harmful products for sale in
California.”119 In other words, the court found that California’s law was consti-
tutional because it was a legitimate exercise of California’s police powers for
the benefit of its citizens.
109 Id. at 55.
110 Id.
111 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5–9, Rocky Mountain v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (Nos. 12-15131, 12-
15135), 2012 WL 4061545, at *5–9.
112 See id. at 6–14.
113 Id. at 6 (“In its most recent extraterritoriality decision, the Court suggested that this doctrine
may be limited to price control laws.”).
114 730 F.3d at 1107.
115 Id. at 1103.
116 Id. at 1101.
117 Id. at 1104.
118 Id. at 1106.
119 Id. at 1104.
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Although the court’s policy analysis has merit, the Ninth Circuit’s attempt
to clarify the doctrinal ambiguity in extraterritoriality is not entirely convinc-
ing. By giving a state free rein to regulate in-state transactions, the majority’s
test would seemingly allow California to use similar regulations to force any
company that sold ethanol in California to comply with its standards for sales
throughout the country. Conceivably, California could also condition in-state
sales on giving out-of-state workers union rights, free health care, or a certain
minimum wage, even when such workers exclusively produced goods bound
for non-California markets. This Article’s corresponding interest requirement,
however, would police against such regulations. Moreover, the Connecticut
price affirmation law at issue in Healy would arguably survive the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s test, since it technically applied only to sales in Connecticut. In short,
Rocky Mountain seems to eviscerate the extraterritoriality doctrine, arguably in
contravention of binding Supreme Court precedent such as Healy.
Recognizing this, Judge Milan D. Smith, joined by five other Ninth Circuit
judges, vigorously argued in dissent from a denial of en banc review that the
LCFS violates the extraterritoriality doctrine.120 Citing Healy, Judge Smith
contended:
It is no answer to assert, as the majority does, that the Fuel Standard
merely provides “incentives” that might influence out-of-state con-
duct. By penalizing certain out-of-state practices, California’s regula-
tions control out-of-state conduct just as surely as a mandate would,
particularly in view of California’s economic clout. Thus, whether
California’s scheme is characterized as providing “incentives” or es-
tablishing “mandates,” it has the practical effect of regulating inter-
state commerce. And, under the dormant Commerce Clause, “[t]he
critical inquiry is whether the practical effect of the regulation is to
control conduct beyond the boundaries of the State.”121
The dissent, however, seems to commit the opposite error—like the plaintiffs, it
advocated for an implausibly expansive interpretation of Healy’s practical ef-
fects test that would have the potential to invalidate most state economic
regulation.
The litigation over California’s LCFS demonstrates the desperate need for
clarity in the extraterritoriality doctrine. Strongly supported by language from
the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs advanced an argument that would logically
invalidate any state regulation that affects out-of-state conduct. The State, how-
ever, defended its legislation by citing precedent suggesting that states have
free rein to regulate conduct in other states, so long as they do not do so di-
rectly. Faced with this conflicting precedent, the federal judges not only were
120 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 740 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2014) (Smith, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc). A sixth judge, Judge Murguia, joined the dissent in part.
See id.
121 Id. at 518 (citation omitted) (quoting Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989)).
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unable to agree on the proper outcome, but they also could not agree on a
plausible approach to guide future decisions.
This lack of doctrinal clarity is not merely an academic matter. Although
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rocky Mountain,122 a number of other
states are passing legislation similar to California’s Global Warming Solutions
Act.123 Other courts will confront this issue again, and the Supreme Court could
intervene once the landscape of state legislation is more settled. Moreover, as
the next section details, these same extraterritoriality issues are arising in other
contexts as well.
B. California’s Farm Animal Welfare Legislation
California’s recent farm animal welfare legislation, and the resulting litiga-
tion, closely parallels the battle over California’s Global Warming Solutions
Act. As with carbon emissions, Congress has done little to address the issue of
farm animal welfare. Although federal law protects companion animals,124 ani-
mals used in experiments,125 and some wild animals,126 it affords virtually no
protection to farm animals prior to slaughter.127 Until relatively recently, state
law also typically provided virtually no protections for farm animals.128 Moreo-
ver, the agricultural industry has been reluctant to regulate itself, as the market
places incentives on farms to produce the cheapest possible products, with little
or no regard to animal welfare.129
122 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (mem.).
123 Minnesota’s Next Generation Energy Act, for example, is discussed supra notes 76–79 and R
accompanying text.
124 Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2012).
125 Id.
126 See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2012); Endangered Species Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
127 Only two federal statutes apply to farm animals: the Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter
Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2012), and the Twenty-Eight Hour Act, 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (2012).
Each statute is extremely limited in scope. The Humane Methods of Livestock Slaughter Act
regulates only the ultimate act of slaughter and does not apply to poultry. 7 U.S.C. § 1902. Moreo-
ver, the Twenty-Eight Hour Act regulates only the length of time livestock can be confined during
travel. 49 U.S.C. § 80502(a). Even these limited federal regulations are notoriously under-en-
forced. See Samantha Mortlock, Standing on New Ground: Underenforcement of Animal Protec-
tion Laws Causes Competitive Injury to Complying Entities, 32 VT. L. REV. 273, 273–77 (2007).
The Humane Society and the United Egg Producers have agreed to push for a new federal law
governing the size of cages for egg-laying hens that would eliminate the use of battery cages. See
JOEL L. GREEN & TADLOCK COWAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42534, TABLE EGG PRODUCTION
AND HEN WELFARE: AGREEMENT AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 1 (2014). This legislation, how-
ever, has been blocked in large part due to opposition from other agricultural interests that are
worried such a bill could set a precedent for future federal animal welfare standards. Id. at 15.
128 In most states, animal cruelty statutes do not apply to agricultural animals, and, where such
laws do apply, the term “cruelty” is typically defined to reflect rather than change agricultural
practices. See Colin Kreuziger, Dismembering the Meat Industry Piece by Piece: The Value of
Federalism to Farm Animals, 23 LAW & INEQ. 363, 374–76 (2005).
129 See Sean P. Sullivan, Empowering Market Regulation of Agricultural Animal Welfare Through
Product Labeling, 19 ANIMAL L. 391, 404–05, 418–19 (2013); Jeff Leslie & Cass Sunstein,
Animal Rights Without Controversy, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 118 (2007). Although most
Americans oppose common practices such as small gestation crates for pregnant sows and the
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Over the last decade, a number of states have filled this void by prohibit-
ing some of the most extreme and controversial practices of livestock confine-
ment. Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, Oregon,
and Rhode Island have each passed legislation phasing out the use of gestation
crates for pregnant pigs.130 A gestation crate is a metal stall placed over a con-
crete floor that is only slightly larger than the sow.131 Breeding sows are typi-
cally placed in gestation crates for the entirety of their four-month
pregnancies.132 Because breeding sows are generally impregnated less than a
month after their last birthing, the sows spend the majority of their lives in
these small crates.133 Many of the same states that ban gestation crates for
breeding sows also prohibit the use of veal crates, which are stalls used to
house young beef calves.134 Like gestation crates, veal crates are only slightly
larger than the animal, making it virtually impossible for the calf to move.135
California and Michigan have also passed laws regulating the size of cages
used to house egg-laying chickens.136 In the absence of such legislation, most of
these birds are housed in what is known as a “battery cage,” a barren wire cage
that typically holds five to ten birds and provides each bird with an amount of
space equivalent to a standard sheet of notebook paper.137 California, for exam-
ple, banned each of these practices through a ballot initiative passed in 2008.
Now codified as the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act, it dictates that
calves raised for veal, pregnant pigs, and egg-laying chickens must be raised in
a manner that allows the animals to lie down, stand up, fully extend their limbs,
and turn around freely.138 The Act became effective in 2015.
California has also banned the practice of force-feeding birds, a technique
that is used in the production of foie gras, a delicacy made from an engorged
intense confinement of egg-producing chickens, consumers have largely failed to use their
purchasing power to create incentives for farms to change. See Sullivan, supra, at 406; Leslie &
Sunstein, supra, at 119; David J. Wolfson & Marian Sullivan, Foxes in the Hen House: Animals,
Agribusiness, and the Law: A Modern American Fable, in ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES
AND NEW DIRECTIONS 205, 225 (Cass Sunstein & Martha Nussbaum eds., Oxford Univ. Press
2000). This is not necessarily because consumers are unwilling to pay for animal welfare; instead,
the market is unable to function efficiently because consumers have imperfect knowledge. Sulli-
van, supra, at 422. Not only are most consumers ignorant of modern farming practices, but even
when they do have such information, they are largely unable to use their purchasing power to
express their preferences. Id. at 416. Although food packaging occasionally contains information
regarding the treatment of livestock, consumers generally do not understand or trust this labeling
information. Id. at 410.
130 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2910.07 (2006); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–94
(West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50.5-101–103 (West 2015); FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21;
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 4020 (2015); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 287.746 (2015); OHIO ADMIN. CODE
901:12-8 (2014); OR. REV. STAT. § 600.150 (2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4-1.1-3 (2014).
131 See Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 129, at 218. R
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Arizona, Colorado, California, Maine, Michigan, Ohio, and Rhode Island have all taken mea-
sures to phase out the use of veal crates. See statutes cited supra note 130. R
135 Wolfson & Sullivan, supra note 129, at 218–19. R
136 See GREEN & COWAN, supra note 127, at 23–25. R
137 Id. at 7.
138 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–94 (West 2015).
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duck or goose liver.139 During this process, the bird is force-fed through a metal
tube inserted into its throat.140 The California foie gras law was passed in 2004
and became effective in 2012.141
Most states, however, have not enacted such animal welfare legislation. In
fact, the largest producers of pork, veal, and eggs are notably absent from the
list of states passing livestock protection laws. The three largest producers of
pork, for example, are Iowa, Minnesota, and Illinois,142 and the three largest
producers of eggs are Iowa, Ohio, and Indiana.143 California is the only state
that both is a leading national producer of farm animal products and has passed
animal protection laws regulating the conditions in which such animals are
raised.144 Because the markets for most animal products are national, most
products sold in stores throughout the country are from animals that were sub-
jected to intense confinement. As a result, although California’s Prevention of
Farm Animal Cruelty Act may stop inhumane practices on California farms, it
has little effect on the manner in which most of the animals consumed by
Californians are raised.
Because of this inherent limitation on in-state regulations, California also
enacted two laws banning, not just the use of inhumane practices in California,
but also the in-state sale of any products derived from such practices. In 2005,
California passed a law prohibiting the sale of foie gras in the state. Specifi-
cally, it provides: “A product may not be sold in California if it is the result of
force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver beyond normal
size.”145 This law took effect in 2012. Moreover, in 2010, California passed AB
1437, which requires that all eggs sold in the state comply with the require-
ments of the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act.146 In other words, each
egg sold in California must be from a hen that was raised in a manner that
allowed the hen to lie down, stand up, fully extend its limbs, and turn around
139 Id. §§ 25980–84.
140 See Ass’n des E´leveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Que´bec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir.
2013).
141 In January 2015, however, a federal district court held that the law is preempted by the federal
Poultry Products Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451–70 (2012), and the court therefore enjoined its
enforcement. See Ass’n des E´leveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Que´bec v. Harris, No. 2:12-cv-5735-
SVW-RZ, 2015 WL 191375, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan 7, 2015). As of the time of this writing, the
district court’s order was being reviewed on appeal.
142 Pork Facts, NAT’L PORK PRODUCERS COUNCIL, http://perma.cc/QJ44-6Z35.
143 About the U.S. Egg Industry, AM. EGG BD., http://perma.cc/3YUT-8UQ4; NAT’L AGRIC. STA-
TISTICS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CHICKENS AND EGGS 8–11 (2015), http://perma.cc/VLM4-
VUTP. Although Ohio passed regulations banning the use of gestation crates by 2025, it does not
regulate the size of cages for egg-laying hens. See GREEN & COWAN, supra note 127, at 23–24 R
(listing only legislation in California and Michigan); State Legislation, FARM SANCTUARY, http://
perma.cc/MJD2-WC47.
144 California is ranked sixth in the nation in egg production, with approximately 14,669,000 egg-
laying hens. About the U.S. Egg Industry, supra note 143. R
145 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (West 2015).
146 Cal. Assem. Bill No. 1437 (2009–2010 Reg. Sess.); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25996.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLE\39-2\HLE204.txt unknown Seq: 22 24-JUN-15 8:29
444 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 39
freely.147 Failure to comply with the statute is a misdemeanor punishable by a
fine of $1,000, a jail term not to exceed 180 days, or both.148
Although a state unquestionably has the power to regulate the conditions
in which livestock are raised in-state, California’s more aggressive prohibitions
on the sale of foie gras and eggs laid by hens raised in battery cages have been
challenged in federal court. The plaintiffs in each case argue, among other
things, that the legislation violates the dormant Commerce Clause by regulating
extraterritorial conduct.149 Essentially, the plaintiffs contend that California can-
not tell farmers in other states how to raise their livestock.
The day after California’s ban on the sale of foie gras came into effect, a
California restaurant and two out-of-state companies that raise ducks used to
produce foie gras filed a federal lawsuit seeking to enjoin enforcement of the
law.150 After the district court denied the foie gras companies’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, they filed an interlocutory appeal to the Ninth Circuit.151
In their brief to the Ninth Circuit, the foie gras companies argued that
California’s ban on the sale of foie gras violated the extraterritoriality doctrine
because “the practical effect—and perhaps the very purpose—of section 25982
is to project California’s preferred agricultural practices on farmers outside the
state.”152 According to the foie gras companies, “[i]f section 25982 were to
survive this constitutional challenge, it would open the floodgates to economic
Balkanization, with every state welcome to start banning imports of USDA-
approved products and commodities that were not produced using that state’s
preferred practices.”153 Like the ethanol companies in Rocky Mountain, the foie
gras companies argued that, while California can ban the sale of products due
to concerns about how those products will affect Californians, it cannot ban a
healthy product because of how that product was created in another state.154
The Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the foie gras companies’ argument
and held that California’s ban on the sale of foie gras did not violate the extra-
territoriality doctrine.155 The court found that California’s statute did not have
the purpose of targeting out-of-state conduct; instead, the law was designed to
147 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–96.
148 Id. § 25997.
149 See Missouri v. Harris, No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN, 2014 WL 4961473, at *2, *8 n.5 (E.D.
Cal. Oct. 2, 2014); Ass’n des E´leveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Que´bec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937,
949 (9th Cir. 2013). Plaintiffs in Missouri v. Harris also contended that the California legislation
is preempted by federal law, see 2014 WL 4961473, at *3–4, and in Ass’n des E´leveurs, plaintiffs
argued that the legislation violates the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-
of-state business, see 729 F.3d at 947. These arguments are outside the scope of this Article.
150 Ass’n des E´leveurs, 729 F.3d at 942.
151 Id. at 943.
152 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 20, Ass’n des E´leveurs, 729 F.3d 937 (No. 12-56822), 2012 WL
5915406, at *20.
153 Id.
154 Similarly, the foie gras companies argued that the law imposed a burden on the poultry market
without any corresponding local benefit because “not a single duck or goose in California is
protected by applying section 25982 to . . . ducks and geese born, raised, and slaughtered entirely
outside the state.” Id. at *22.
155 See Ass’n des E´leveurs, 729 F.3d at 949–50. The court also held that the statute was nondis-
criminatory and was not preempted. Id. at 948.
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prevent the production or purchase of foie gras in California.156 The court ex-
plained: “the State believed that the sales ban in California may discourage the
consumption of products produced by force feeding birds and prevent complic-
ity in a practice that it deemed cruel to animals.”157 Moreover, the court held
that the plaintiffs had not shown that the law would have the practical effect of
regulating out-of-state conduct: Because the plaintiffs could simply sell foie
gras in other states, California’s law did not have the effect of dictating require-
ments for the national market.158 The Supreme Court denied the foie gras com-
panies’ petition for certiorari on October 14, 2014.159
Litigation over California’s egg law parallels the foie gras case. In Febru-
ary 2014, the State of Missouri filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of California to enjoin the enforcement of California’s egg
law.160 In this case, styled Missouri v. Harris,161 Missouri argued that Califor-
nia’s egg law violates the dormant Commerce Clause by, among other things,
regulating extraterritorial conduct.162 The complaint explained:
As the second largest exporter of shell eggs to California, Missouri
farmers face a difficult choice regarding AB1437. Either they can
incur massive capital improvement costs to build larger habitats for
some or all of Missouri’s seven million egg-laying hens, or they can
walk away from the state whose consumers bought one third of all
eggs produced in Missouri last year.163
The complaint further asserted that, because of fluctuating regional demand
“most Missouri egg farmers will choose either to bring their entire operations
into compliance with AB1437 so that they always have enough supply to meet
California demand, or else simply leave the California marketplace.”164 Ne-
braska, Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Iowa joined the suit.165 Missouri
was pressed as a test case, because many in the agricultural sector are con-
cerned that a victory with respect to poultry could lead to similar measures with
respect to gestation and veal crates.166
Like in the ethanol and foie gras litigation, the parties in Missouri ad-
vanced drastically different interpretations of the extraterritoriality doctrine. In
its motion to dismiss, California relied on Rocky Mountain to argue that the
State may regulate the sale of eggs within its borders “with the goal of influ-
156 Id. at 949.
157 Id. at 952.
158 Id. at 950.
159 Ass’n des E´leveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Que´bec v. Harris, 135 S. Ct. 398 (2014) (mem.).
160 Complaint at 2, Missouri v. Harris, 2014 WL 4961473 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 2:14-cv-
00341-KJM-KJN), 2014 WL 840950.
161 No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN, 2014 WL 4961473 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2014).
162 Complaint, supra note 160, at 4. R
163 Id. at 3.
164 Id. at 15.
165 See First Amended Complaint at 2, Missouri, 2014 WL 4961473 (No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-
KJN), 2014 WL 1245038.
166 See Lorelei Laird, California’s Ban on Standard-Caged Birds Poses a Chicken-Egg Problem,
ABA JOURNAL (June 1, 2014), http://perma.cc/36QC-MWHX.
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encing the out-of-state choice of market participants.”167 Moreover, the Associ-
ation of California Egg Farmers, which intervened in the case, argued that the
case is indistinguishable from the Ninth Circuit’s opinion upholding the ban on
foie gras.168 Just as the foie gras law did not require the companies to stop force
feeding birds, “[n]othing prevents out-of-state producers from using their pre-
ferred hen cages and selling eggs in other states.”169 The Association further
asserted: “To the extent AB 1437 and § 1350 have an indirect economic effect
on out-of-state egg producers, that is of no constitutional significance.”170
Missouri, however, relied on cases like Healy to argue that the court must
look to the practical effect of the statute to determine if it regulates extraterrito-
rially.171 Applying this rule, Missouri contended that, “[a]s a practical matter,
AB1437 regulates commerce occurring entirely outside of California by forcing
egg farmers in Plaintiff States to change their production methods to comply
with California law.”172
As this litigation demonstrates, the lack of doctrinal clarity allows the par-
ties to give the court drastically different interpretations of the extraterritoriality
doctrine. Relying on one line of authority, California essentially asserted that it
is not violating the doctrine because it is only directly regulating in-state egg
sales. Missouri, however, relied on conflicting authority to argue that the law is
unconstitutional because its practical effect is to force Missourians to change
their agricultural practices. Although California’s position is perhaps better sup-
ported by Ninth Circuit precedent like Rocky Mountain, the dissenting opinions
in the denial of en banc review suggest that certain panels may not be interested
in extending Rocky Mountain’s holding. Extraterritoriality’s doctrinal incoher-
ence therefore makes this litigation confusing and unpredictable.
The district court, however, recently dismissed Harris on standing grounds
without reaching the merits of Missouri’s extraterritoriality claim.173 This dis-
missal, of course, does not resolve the underlying issue. Missouri has appealed
the ruling,174 and private egg farmers would undoubtedly have standing to chal-
lenge California’s law and thus may file a separate suit in the future. Califor-
nia’s law therefore remains vulnerable to attack under existing doctrine,
167 Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint at 13, Missouri, 2014 WL 4961473 (No. 2:14-cv-
00341-KJM-KJN), 2014 WL 1651868 (quoting Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730
F.3d 1070, 1103 (9th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Memorandum of Law in Support of (Proposed) Motion to Dismiss or for Judgment on the
Pleadings of Proposed Defendant-Intervenor Assoc. of California Egg Farmers at 1, Missouri,
2014 WL 4961473 (No. 2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN), 2014 WL 2142170.
169 Id. at 10.
170 Id. at 11.
171 Plaintiffs’ Amended Combined Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Proposed
Defendant-Intervenor HSUS’s Proposed Motion to Dismiss, Proposed Defendant-Intervenor
ACEF’s Proposed Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 30, Missouri, 2014 WL 4961473 (No.
2:14-cv-00341-KJM-KJN), 2014 WL 2745030, at *30.
172 Id.
173 Missouri, 2014 WL 4961473, at *17. The court reasoned that Missouri and the other states that
joined the suit lacked standing because they brought suit on behalf of a discrete group of egg
farmers rather than the well-being of their residents in general. Id. at *11.
174 Notice of Appeal and Representation Statement, Missouri, 2014 WL 4961473 (No. 2:14-cv-
00341-KJM-KJN), ECF No. 104.
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creating uncertainty in the egg industry. Moreover, the constitutionality of any
similar legislation being considered in other states or covering other animals
also remains in doubt.
C. Applying This Article’s Doctrinal Test
This Article’s interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine would pro-
vide a consistent and coherent approach to cases like Rocky Mountain and Har-
ris.175 Like the labelling cases, California’s legislation only has the inescapable
effect of regulating products bound for the California market.176 Just as the Sec-
ond Circuit suggested that the manufacturers in Sorrell could operate separate
facilities for Connecticut-compliant light bulbs,177 farmers can keep chickens
laying eggs bound for California in separate cages and ethanol companies theo-
retically could operate separate facilities for ethanol bound for California mar-
kets. As the Second Circuit explained in Sorrell,178 any increased cost resulting
from such inefficiency theoretically could be passed on to California consum-
ers.179 If passing the cost on is not possible, the out-of-state companies could
simply decide to stop selling in California.180
Although California’s legislation does have the inescapable effect of regu-
lating the production of goods bound for California, the state likely has a corre-
sponding interest in the manner in which such products are made. As detailed
above, the LCFS targets the lifecycle of ethanol because any policy that ignores
out-of-state pollution would be wholly ineffective at reducing the emissions
caused by Californians.181 And, as the California legislature explained when it
passed the Global Warming Solutions Act, the State has a vital interest in re-
175 The case would also be easy to resolve if the legislation were found to discriminate against out-
of-state commerce. As noted above, discriminatory legislation is subject to a strong presumption
of unconstitutionality. See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504
U.S. 353, 359 (1992).
176 See cases cited supra notes 46–54 and accompanying text. R
177 Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Int’l Dairy Foods
Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 647 (6th Cir. 2010).
178 272 F.3d at 110.
179 Although Missouri alleged that it would be prohibitively expensive to have separate production
lines for California products (and the same would no doubt be true for ethanol producers), the
court in Sorrell rejected similar arguments. Id. at 110–11. The extraterritoriality principle concerns
the allocation of power in our federal system, and therefore the important point is that California
has not used its power actually to regulate the out-of-state production process.
180 The court in Sorrell explained:
But in every such case, a decision to abandon the state’s market rests entirely with
individual manufacturers based on the opportunity cost of capital, their individual pro-
duction costs, and what the demand in the state will bear. Because none of these vari-
ables is controlled by the state in this case, we cannot say that the choice to stay or leave
has been made for manufacturers by the state legislature, as the Commerce Clause
would prohibit.
Id. at 111.
181 See supra text accompanying notes 95–96. Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 790, 794–95 R
(8th Cir. 1990), discussed supra Part I, supports the proposition that a state’s interest in environ-
mental protection is sufficient to justify extraterritorial regulation.
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ducing carbon emissions to spur others into action and protect the environ-
ment.182 Similarly, because most of the eggs sold in California were produced
in other states, targeting out-of-state production is needed to provide healthy
eggs and prevent Californians from consuming the products of animal cru-
elty.183 California’s legislation therefore likely has the inescapable effect of reg-
ulating only out-of-state conduct in which California has a corresponding
interest.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY
So far, this Article has discussed doctrine, precedent, and ongoing litiga-
tion while giving short shrift to underlying issues of policy and constitutional
theory. This Part more fully explores these issues while arguing that this Arti-
cle’s proposed extraterritoriality test is superior to the competing interpretations
advanced in the California litigation.
A. The Need for a Limited Extraterritoriality Doctrine
Although scholars and jurists have questioned the need for a separate ex-
traterritoriality doctrine,184 it is an important part of our federal system. The
Supreme Court has explained that the doctrine is based on the fundamental
principle that “[n]o state can legislate except with reference to its own juris-
diction.”185 Accordingly, “[t]he limits on a State’s power to enact substantive
legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either
case, ‘any attempt “directly” to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over persons
or property would offend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the
State’s power.’” 186 The extraterritoriality doctrine therefore “reflect[s] the Con-
stitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national economic
union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate commerce and with
the autonomy of the individual States within their respective spheres.”187 In
other words, extraterritoriality helps preserve federalism by ensuring that the
states do not exceed their sphere of sovereign power. The courts should not
182 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. R
183 Cf. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 648 (6th Cir. 2010) (upholding Ohio
labeling requirements for the safety of milk).
184 See supra note 3. R
185 Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
186 Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 197
(1977)).
187 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335–36 (1989). Similarly, the Court in BMW stated: “We
think it follows from these principles of state sovereignty and comity that a State may not impose
economic sanctions on violators of its laws with the intent of changing the tortfeasors’ lawful
conduct in other States.” BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 572 (1996) (emphasis
added). Although the Court has based limitations on punitive damages in the Due Process Clause
rather than the dormant Commerce Clause, see State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538
U.S. 408, 416 (2003), the Court’s limitations on punitive damages are based in the same funda-
mental federalism concerns. See Michael P. Allen, The Supreme Court, Punitive Damages and
State Sovereignty, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 13–30 (2004).
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abandon such a fundamental doctrine merely because they have had trouble
defining it, as some scholars contend.188
Once extraterritoriality is recognized as a means of protecting state sover-
eignty, a broad conception of the doctrine also becomes untenable. A strong
interpretation of Healy’s “practical effects” test, as advocated by the plaintiffs
in the California litigation, would prohibit the states from passing legislation
that has consequences beyond its borders. However, “[t]he modern reality is
that the States frequently regulate activities that occur entirely within one State
but that have effects in many.”189 As a result, an expansive interpretation of the
Healy test would invalidate too much state legislation. This is problematic, not
just because expansive interpretation would dramatically alter the status quo,
but also because it would undermine state sovereignty by prohibiting states
from passing legislation to address serious in-state issues. If “the State govern-
ments [are to] remain, and constitute a most important part of our system,” as
Justice Marshall asserted in Gibbons v. Ogden,190 the states must have the
power to regulate in-state conduct even when such regulations have out-of-state
effects.
The narrow interpretation of extraterritoriality endorsed by California and
the Ninth Circuit, however, is similarly problematic. If a state is completely
free to indirectly regulate out-of-state conduct so long as it only directly regu-
lates an in-state transaction, one state will be able to regulate much of the coun-
try. California could, for example, require any company that does business in
California to certify that all of its animals, no matter where they are sold, were
raised in California-compliant conditions. Further, California could require that
companies doing business in California, for example, give their workers union
rights, a certain minimum wage, or free health care throughout their global
operations, even with respect to goods that are not sold in California. Such
actions, however, seem to violate the Constitution’s implicit command that
“[n]o state can legislate except with reference to its own jurisdiction.”191 A
narrow interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine would therefore render it
unable to fulfill its intended purpose of ensuring that a state does not exceed its
sphere of sovereign authority.
This Article’s proposed doctrine avoids these problems. To summarize,
this Article contends that the extraterritoriality doctrine should apply only when
the state directly regulates out-of-state conduct or the state regulates in-state
conduct in such a way that it has the inescapable practical effect of regulating
out-of-state conduct in which the state has no corresponding interest. Unlike the
expansive test advanced by the plaintiffs in the California litigation, this Arti-
cle’s approach would allow states to pass meaningful legislation to address in-
188 See Chad DeVeaux, Lost in the Dismal Swamp: Interstate Class Actions, False Federalism, and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1016 (2011) (noting that “many
scholars find the Commerce Clause’s extraterritoriality prohibition improvident,” but arguing that
the doctrine serves the necessary purpose of protecting state sovereignty).
189 Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 735 F.3d 362, 379 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, J., concurring).
190 22 U.S. 1, 199 (1824).
191 Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U.S. 592, 594 (1881).
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state concerns. For example, California could pass laws governing the wages of
in-state workers, the condition of livestock in California, and emissions in Cali-
fornia. Although such laws would likely have “practical effects” in other
states, they would not inescapably force out-of-state actors to change their
conduct.
This Article’s proposed doctrine also provides a meaningful way in which
to limit state power. Unlike California’s narrow interpretation, the proposed
doctrine would prevent a state from imposing its regulations on goods or ser-
vices produced, transported, and consumed out-of-state. For example, while
California could effectively regulate products on a Missouri farm bound for
California, it could not condition California sales on the Missouri farmer fol-
lowing the same regulations for his products sold to consumers in Florida. Lim-
iting state power in such a manner would fit with the extraterritoriality
doctrine’s role in preserving state sovereignty within our federal system.
Whereas the plaintiffs’ expansive interpretation of the practical effects test
would essentially take away the states’ power to pass meaningful economic
legislation, the state interest requirement would not undermine state sover-
eignty. And, although our federalism depends on a state having the power to
regulate for the protection of its residents, federalism does not contemplate that
one state will regulate for the benefit of other states.192 In fact, the proposed
doctrine would further state sovereignty by preventing states from exercising
power beyond their proper spheres of authority.
B. Why This Article’s Proposed Doctrine Is Superior
to the Manner of Production Test
Although the plaintiffs in the California litigation primarily argued that
any state law with extraterritorial practical effects was unconstitutional, they
also presented a more limited test in the alternative. The plaintiffs in Rocky
Mountain argued on appeal that “where goods in interstate commerce are iden-
tical, and will have exactly the same impacts within the state, a state may not
penalize or ban their sale because of how they were made elsewhere.”193 Simi-
lar arguments could be used in the foie gras and egg litigation. Under this
“manner of production test,” although California can regulate a product for the
purpose of ensuring it is safe and healthy for Californians, the state cannot
regulate a product based only on the manner in which it was produced in an-
other state. For example, while California can regulate the handling and pack-
aging of eggs sold in California to prevent salmonella, California cannot
regulate the size of the hens’ cages because, when the eggs are imported into
California, they are indistinguishable from eggs laid by chickens with larger
cages.194
192 See Edgar v. MITE, 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982).
193 Brief of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union Appellees, supra note 108, at 55. R
194 Although California argues that eggs produced through the use of battery cages are less
healthy, the plaintiffs argue this is a pretextual justification for the law. See Plaintiff’s Opposition
to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and Proposed Defendant-Intervenor HSUS’s Proposed Motion
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An amicus brief in the Rocky Mountain case filed by a group of law
professors more fully developed the theoretical justification for this alternative
approach to extraterritoriality.195 The professors began by establishing that,
“under our federal system, the states are coequal sovereigns, and no state may
exercise authority over another.”196 In other words, “the sovereignty of each
State implies a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States.”197
California infringes on the sovereignty of its sister states, the professors
asserted, because the LCFS seeks to regulate out-of-state conduct when such
conduct has no “effect on the properties of the ethanol ultimately imported into
and used in California.”198 According to the law professors, California cannot
control out-of-state conduct to solve a national problem that “visit[s] an undif-
ferentiated, general injury on the nation as a whole.”199 The professors con-
tended that California can seek to influence out-of-state conduct only when
such conduct causes specific and identifiable in-state harm.200 For example,
California presumably could ban a new form of fuel that caused excessive pol-
lution to control smog in Los Angeles; however, the State cannot regulate the
out-of-state production of ethanol to address global warming. Regardless of
how the ethanol was produced, ethanol use in California will cause the same
level of pollution, and thus the production method causes no specific or identi-
fiable harm in California. According to the law professors, the LCFS infringes
on the sovereignty of other states by essentially regulating the production of
ethanol in those states to address a global problem as opposed to a problem that
is unique to California.201 The Ninth Circuit ultimately rejected the manner of
production test, however, because it lacked precedential support.202
More significantly, the policy interest motivating the plaintiffs and the
amici law professors—state sovereignty—is better protected by this Article’s
proposal than by the manner of production test. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“state sovereignty” as “supreme political authority” or the “right of a state to
self-government.”203 As the Supreme Court explained in Printz v. United
States:204 “Although the States surrendered many of their powers to the new
to Dismiss at 21, Missouri v. Harris, 2014 WL 4961473 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 2:14-cv-00341-
KJM-KJN), 2014 WL 2142174. For the sake of argument, this Article assumes that eggs produced
from battery cages are identical to eggs from larger cages.
195 See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 11. R
196 Id. at 2.
197 Id. at 13 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)).
198 Id. at 12. In Rocky Mountain, the plaintiffs similarly argued that the LCFS should be struck
down because “ethanol is ‘fungible,’ with the same physical and chemical properties, no matter
how or where it is produced.” Brief of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union Appellees, supra note
108, at 66. R
199 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 11, at 14. R
200 Id. at 14–15.
201 Id.
202 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1104 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Plaintiffs
point to no extraterritoriality cases where differences in the physical structure of a product was a
prerequisite to regulation.”). In contrast, this Article’s proposal is strongly supported by precedent
from the Supreme Court and a number of circuit courts.
203 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1631 (10th ed. 2014).
204 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
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Federal Government, they retained a residuary and inviolable sovereignty.”205
Subject to the powers granted to the federal government, the Constitution there-
fore recognizes the “States as independent political entities” in all other re-
spects.206 The sovereign power of the states, often referred to as the “police
power,” is a general power to legislate for the health, welfare, and morals of its
citizens, and is restricted only by the limitations provided in the Constitution.207
The law professors’ argument depends on a view of state sovereignty that
is both too narrow and too broad. With respect to California, their argument
relies on a narrow view of state power to regulate in-state conduct. According
to the professors, California sought to reduce out-of-state emissions related to
ethanol production and distribution “solely because those practices visit an un-
differentiated, general injury on the nation as a whole and California is part of
the nation.”208 This is a rather uncharitable characterization of California’s ac-
tions. California is not simply regulating random out-of-state conduct to solve a
global problem. Instead, California is regulating in-state sales to reduce the
emissions associated with in-state consumption.209 As explained above, if Cali-
fornia does not account for the lifecycle of the fuel used by Californians, its
regulations will be ineffective at reducing the emissions associated with in-state
use.210 The LCFS is thus an exercise of California’s sovereign power to reduce
the harmful consequences of purely in-state fuel usage. Seemingly lost from the
professors’ argument is that ruling against the LCFS would limit the sovereign
power of California to address the harm caused by its citizens’ in-state actions.
Similarly, if California lacks the power to ban the sale of eggs from chick-
ens raised in battery cages, California will lose the power to protect the morals
of its citizens. California imports nearly half of its eggs from other states.211 A
ban only on the in-state use of battery cages would therefore be ineffective at
preventing California’s residents from eating eggs from chickens raised in bat-
tery cages and thus participating in animal cruelty. The only way California can
protect the morals of its citizens by ending complicity with animal cruelty is to
pass legislation like the egg law. If such a law is found unconstitutional, Cali-
fornia’s sovereign power will be diminished.
While the law professors’ amicus brief fails to fully account for Califor-
nia’s sovereign power, it inflates the extent to which legislation like the LCFS
or the egg law interferes with the sovereignty of other states. Quite simply, this
legislation does not limit any other states’ ability to use their political power to
regulate internal affairs. Ohio, for example, remains perfectly free to pass regu-
lations governing ethanol and egg production without any legal requirement to
abide by California’s legislation. From the perspective of ensuring a proper al-
205 Id. at 918–19 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison)).
206 Id. at 919.
207 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012).
208 Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 11, at 14. R
209 See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text. R
210 See supra text accompanying notes 95–96. R
211 See First Amended Complaint, supra note 165, at 10 (asserting that California produces about R
five billion eggs per year and imports about four billion eggs from other states).
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location of state sovereignty in our federal system, the courts therefore should
focus on whether California has exceeded its sovereign authority rather than
whether the sovereign power of other states has been invaded. For the reasons
discussed above, California has not done so because it has regulated in-state
sales to regulate out-of-state conduct only when necessary to achieve a legiti-
mate in-state purpose.
The real problem raised by the plaintiffs and the amicus law professors
therefore is not that California has reduced the political power of other states,
but instead that California is not treating the laws of other states with equal
respect. When California bans the in-state sale of eggs produced in Missouri
because the use of battery cages is cruel rather than because the eggs are infer-
ior, California is not limiting the police power of Missouri. Instead, California
is refusing to give equal respect to the laws of Missouri by essentially pro-
claiming that Missouri law is unfit for Californians. The amici law professors’
argument is therefore served by the policy of state equality rather than state
sovereignty. In fact, by limiting California’s political power to address local
harms, the amici law professor’s argument undermines California sovereignty
to further the value of state equality. While this Article’s doctrinal proposal
maximizes state sovereignty at the expense of giving equal respect to laws of
other states, the manner of production doctrine would limit state sovereignty in
favor of equality.
When these two values conflict, the courts have consistently favored state
sovereignty over giving equal force to the laws of other states. The greatest
division between the states in U.S. history—the conflict over slavery—
presented this very same issue.212 In Lemmon v. People,213 a Virginia slave
owner, Johnathan Lemmon, temporarily travelled through New York with his
eight slaves while in route to Louisiana.214 When local residents discovered that
the Lemmons were holding slaves in the city, they filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, seeking to have the court declare that the Lemmons had no legal
right to hold slaves while on New York soil.215 Throughout the resulting litiga-
tion, southerners argued that, because traditional choice of law principles re-
quired application of Virginia law since that was the state of domicile, New
York had to recognize the habeas petitioners as slaves.
The New York Court of Appeals, however, held that the Lemmons’ slaves
were entitled to their freedom.216 The court explained that “[t]he question
[presented] is one affecting the State [of New York] in her sovereignty. As a
sovereign State she may determine and regulate the status or social and civil
212 See Jeffrey Schmitt, Constitutional Limitations on Extraterritorial State Power: State Regula-
tion, Choice of Law, and Slavery, 83 MISS. L.J. 59, 90 (2014).
213 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
214 At this time, the fastest and most convenient route was to travel by ship from Virginia to New
York, and then from steamship to Louisiana. Schmitt, supra note 212, at 80. See also REPORT OF R
THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE: CONTAINING POINTS AND ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL ON BOTH SIDES,
AND OPINIONS OF ALL THE JUSTICES (N.Y.C., Horace Greely & Co. 1860) [hereinafter REPORT OF
THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE].
215 REPORT OF THE LEMMON SLAVE CASE, supra note 214. R
216 Lemmon, 20 N.Y. at 632.
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condition of her citizens, and every description of persons within her terri-
tory.”217 The court continued:
The relation [of slavery] exists, if at all, under the laws of Virginia,
and it is not claimed that there is any paramount obligation resting on
this State to recognize and administer the laws of Virginia within her
territory, if they be contrary or repugnant to her policy or prejudicial
to her interests.218
New York therefore exercised its sovereign power to reject the application of
Virginia law, even though the law of the slaves’ domicile would normally con-
trol, simply because New York disagreed with Virginia law. In response, one
southern editor complained that “[f]rom the sublime elevation of her moral
supremacy, New York looks down upon Virginia with horror and contempt.”219
The conflict between state equality and state sovereignty in the Lemmon
case parallels the conflict in the California litigation. Like the plaintiffs in the
California cases, southerners argued that a state could not reject the law of
another state simply because of moral disagreement with it. The New York
court, however, rejected this argument because it found that state sovereignty
carried with it the power to reject the legal and moral force of Virginia’s law
within New York’s borders. California similarly has the sovereign power to say
that Missouri standards are not good enough for Californians.
The modern analog to Lemmon is the public policy doctrine in choice of
law. When a case has connections to multiple states, choice of law analysis
determines which state’s law shall govern the dispute. Under the public policy
doctrine, “the law of another state need not be recognized if it too deeply of-
fends forum standards.”220 The public policy doctrine has been used to reject
otherwise applicable out-of-state law on subjects ranging from marriage law to
caps on tort damages.221 In each situation, the forum is exercising its sovereign
power to reject the law of another state simply because of disagreement with
the content of the law, just as California is rejecting the legitimacy of Mis-
souri’s farming practices.
Justice Joseph Story gave the constitutional basis for the public policy doc-
trine and cases like Lemmon nearly two hundred years ago in his seminal Com-
mentaries on the Conflict of Laws.222 Justice Story explained that a state’s laws
can have no intrinsic force, proprio vigore, except within the territo-
rial limits and jurisdiction of that country. . . . Whatever extra-territo-
rial force they are to have, is the result, not of any original power to
217 Id. at 616.
218 Id. at 628.
219 Retaliation, THE SOUTH, reprinted in THE NATIONAL ERA, Dec. 24, 1857.
220 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy
Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1972 (1997).
221 Id. at 1973.
222 See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (Boston, Hilliard,
Gray, & Co. 1834).
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extend them abroad, but of that respect, which from motives of public
policy other nations are disposed to yield to them.223
He further stated: “It is an essential attribute of every sovereignty, that it has no
admitted superior, and that it gives the supreme law within its own domains on
all subjects appertaining to its sovereignty.”224 California’s sovereignty there-
fore implies that it has no obligation to give equal respect to the law of Mis-
souri. California is free to regulate in-state transactions to protect the health,
welfare, and morals of Californians, even if that means California is not re-
specting Missouri’s policy choices. Put differently, Missouri has no power to
tell California what animal welfare or environmental standards should be ac-
ceptable for Californian consumers. State sovereignty includes the power to
enact legislation that rejects the policy choices made by other states.
This Article’s proposal best serves the value of state sovereignty. To pro-
tect the health, welfare, and morals of its residents, a state sometimes needs to
exercise its sovereign power to treat goods differently based only on the man-
ner in which they were produced. California, for example, must treat ethanol
and eggs sold in-state differently based on the manner in which they were pro-
duced to address California’s role in serious issues that have huge consequences
for state residents. Specifically, California should be able to use its sovereign
power to protect the “health and welfare”225 of its citizens by reducing the
amount of pollution Californians produce. Moreover, California should have
the power to legislate for the “morals” of its citizens by ensuring that they do
not participate in animal cruelty.226 In doing so, California is exercising its sov-
ereignty for the protection of its own citizens and thus is not disrupting the
allocation of power in our federal system.
CONCLUSION
The principle that one state cannot legislate for the country is a founda-
tional part of our federalism. And yet, the doctrinal embodiment of this princi-
ple is hopelessly confusing, incoherent, and subject to manipulation. Precedent
can be mounted to support the position that any extraterritorial effect, however
small, is unconstitutional or, alternatively, that extraterritorial effects are irrele-
vant so long as a state is directly regulating only in-state conduct. The litigation
223 Id. § 7. The public policy doctrine also meets the Court’s modern requirement announced in
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319 (1981).
224 STORY, supra note 222, § 8; see also, e.g., Dearing v. Bank of Charleston, 5 Ga. 497, 511 R
(1848) (“By the comity of States, the laws of each State are respected in foreign States, unless
they are prejudicial to their national rights, or to the rights of their subjects. But not, if they are so
prejudicial. The independence of every State requires that all other States should concede to it, the
right of protecting its own citizens and their rights, and of enforcing obedience to their own
laws.”)
225 See, e.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“It belongs to that department to exert
what are known as the police powers of the state, and to determine, primarily, what measures are
appropriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public
safety.”).
226 Id.
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over California’s progressive global warming and animal rights legislation illus-
trates that these conflicting positions are currently being used by litigants and
accepted in federal courts. Doctrinal clarity is desperately needed.
An acceptable interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine, however,
has eluded the courts. The extreme positions advanced in the California litiga-
tion, if followed consistently, would have the effect of either crippling all state
economic regulation or eviscerating the extraterritoriality doctrine. As a result,
underlying policy concerns, rather than the doctrine, best explain most extrater-
ritoriality decisions. Looking at the outcomes in a number of lower court cases,
this Article synthesizes the decisions into the following doctrinal proposal: a
state regulation of in-state conduct is unconstitutional only when it has the ines-
capable effect of regulating extraterritorial conduct in which the state has no
corresponding interest.
This doctrinal proposal best serves the policy justification for the extrater-
ritoriality doctrine. The doctrine is based on the need to ensure a proper alloca-
tion of sovereign power in our federal system. Completely abandoning the
doctrine, as many scholars have suggested, would threaten to allow one state to
exceed its proper sphere of authority by regulating conduct for a purpose other
than the health, welfare, and morals of its citizens. Conversely, an expansive
interpretation that would invalidate any state law that has effects in another
state would undermine federalism by eviscerating the states’ ability to enact
meaningful economic legislation.
This Article’s proposed interpretation of the extraterritoriality doctrine is
also superior to the manner of production test advanced by the plaintiffs in the
California litigation. Importantly, unlike that test, this Article’s proposal is sup-
ported by existing precedent. It also furthers state sovereignty by allowing
states to exercise their power to regulate local conduct, even when the regula-
tion is based on out-of-state conduct. As California’s global warming and egg
laws demonstrate, a state must sometimes regulate based on the manner of pro-
duction to protect the health, welfare, and morals of its citizens. Although this
legislation arguably fails to give equal respect to the laws of other states, state
sovereignty includes the power to disagree with the policy choices of other
states. California should be permitted to take serious action to reduce its contri-
bution to global warming and cruelty to animals.
